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The notion that processing spoken (object) words involves activation of category-specific representations
in visual cortex is a key prediction of modality-specific theories of representation that contrasts with
theories assuming dedicated conceptual representational systems abstracted away from sensorimotor
systems. In the present study, we investigated whether participants can detect otherwise invisible pictures
of objects when they are presented with the corresponding spoken word shortly before the picture
appears. Our results showed facilitated detection for congruent (“bottle” ¡ picture of a bottle) versus
incongruent (“bottle”¡ picture of a banana) trials. A second experiment investigated the time-course of
the effect by manipulating the timing of picture presentation relative to word onset and revealed that it
arises as soon as 200–400 ms after word onset and decays at 600 ms after word onset. Together, these
data strongly suggest that spoken words can rapidly activate low-level category-specific visual repre-
sentations that affect the mere detection of a stimulus, that is, what we see. More generally, our findings
fit best with the notion that spoken words activate modality-specific visual representations that are low
level enough to provide information related to a given token and at the same time abstract enough to be
relevant not only for previously seen tokens but also for generalizing to novel exemplars one has never
seen before.
Public Significance Statement
Understanding the cognitive and neural underpinnings of language comprehension is a key problem
in the field of cognitive science. The present study advances our insight into these mechanisms by
demonstrating that spoken words referring to concrete object words activate visual processes
involved in the earliest stages of conscious perception. Our data suggest that basic visual processes
are recruited for language comprehension and support the view that conceptual knowledge at least
partly relies on sensory brain systems.
Keywords: language processing, semantic processing, spoken word comprehension, modality-specific
representations
In the last decade, much of the research on the mechanisms
underlying language comprehension has focused on the role of
modality-specific representations that have traditionally been im-
plicated with vision, hearing, planning and executing movements,
and so forth. A substantial amount of evidence is consistent with
the idea that sensorimotor systems are a component in the process
chain related to conceptual access in language comprehension
(Barsalou, 2008). Numerous studies have found modality-specific
activity (Binder & Desai, 2011; Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrn-
berger, & Kiefer, 2008; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby,
1996), such that conceptual processing involves activation of the
visual cortex (Lewis & Poeppel, 2014), auditory regions in supe-
rior posterior and middle temporal gyri (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger,
Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008), gustatory regions (Simmons, Martin, &
Barsalou, 2005), primary olfactory cortex (González et al., 2006),
or motor regions (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005;
Shtyrov, Butorina, Nikolaeva, & Stroganova, 2014). Based on
these findings it has been proposed that perceptual simulation is a
prime mechanism for language comprehension (e.g., Barsalou,
2008; Pulvermüller, 2005), or at least an important part of it.
Several recent review papers, however, have pointed out (rightly,
in our view) that theoretical progress has been limited and some of
the fundamental questions remain unclear (Binder & Desai, 2011;
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Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Mete-
yard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Willems & Casas-
anto, 2011).
One such question is whether processing of (object) words
involves activating category-specific low-level visual representa-
tions in visual cortex. This is a key prediction of modality-specific
theories of representation, which contrasts with theories assuming
dedicated conceptual representational systems abstracted away
from sensorimotor systems. Some experimental evidence is con-
sistent with such a prediction. A functional magnetic resonance
imaging study found increased activation in Brodmann area (BA)
19 (a visual association area) for visual compared with abstract
sentences (Desai, Binder, Conant, & Seidenberg, 2010). Similarly,
overtly and covertly producing words related to visually salient
concepts activated BA 18 (Hwang, Palmer, Basho, Zadra, &
Müller, 2009). Moreover, a recent magnetoencephalography
(MEG) study benefiting from excellent temporal resolution found
a correlation between the imageability of object words and acti-
vation in BA 19 as rapid as ca. 200 ms after word onset (Lewis &
Poeppel, 2014). While intriguing, these findings, however, do not
tell us much about the nature of the representations that were
accessed. To be useful for conceptual processing, visual represen-
tations need to be specific enough to provide information related to
a given concept and at the same time abstract enough to be relevant
not only for previously seen tokens (a signature of episodic mem-
ory) but also for recognizing novel exemplars and grasping the
concept’s meaning more generally. Because of these requirements,
it is not obvious that low-level sensory areas (as opposed to
high-level areas that are based on more holistic representations)
are useful for conceptual processing and can provide this sort of
information.
In the present study, we directly tested whether low-level visual
representations are involved in spoken word processing. Using
continuous flash suppression (CFS) we show that spoken words
activate behaviorally relevant low-level visual representations and
pin down the time-course of this effect to the first hundreds of
milliseconds after word onset.
Thus far, research into object knowledge representation has
been largely restricted to high-level visual cortex. While it is
uncontroversial that higher level visual areas are strongly impli-
cated in conceptual processing related to objects (Binder & Desai,
2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Martin, 2007), it
remains open what types of representations are involved. On the
one hand, several recent studies found that activation patterns in
these regions are dominated by strikingly low-level visual features
(Andrews, Watson, Rice, & Hartley, 2015; Nasr, Echavarria, &
Tootell, 2014; Watson, Hymers, Hartley, & Andrews, 2016). A
recent study with macaque monkeys suggests that low-level infor-
mation may be represented most explicitly in anterior regions such
as inferior temporal lobe (IT) rather than visual cortex V4 and V1
(Hong, Yamins, Majaj, & DiCarlo, 2016), such that category-
orthogonal features of pictures, such as position, size, pose, and so
forth can be decoded much more reliably from IT than early visual
cortex. On the other hand, there is evidence from studies with blind
individuals suggesting that the properties of high-level visual areas
are better described as multimodal (e.g., Mahon, Anzellotti,
Schwarzbach, Zampini, & Caramazza, 2009; for review and dis-
cussion, see: Bi, Wang, & Caramazza, 2016), pointing to the
possibility that visual information is transduced into conceptual
information relatively early in the ventral stream. Though fasci-
nating, the currently available data from research on high-level
visual brain regions therefore cannot elucidate to what extent
conceptual processing relies on low-level modality-specific visual
representations.
A similar issue arises in the context of the available behavioral
data. Many studies point to a tight link between conceptual pro-
cessing of object concepts and visual perception. Words can en-
hance attention to the corresponding categories in a visual search
task (Lupyan & Spivey, 2010b), have a stronger effect on visual
categorization than equally informative environmental sounds
(Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015; Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012),
and facilitate the perception of shape-matching versus mismatch-
ing objects (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002; but see Rommers,
Meyer, & Huettig, 2013). However, what all of these studies have
in common is that the picture targets are not only processed on the
visual level, but also the conceptual level. Therefore it cannot be
ruled out that the reported effects arose from congruency on a
high-level system instead of the visual system. This problem
cannot easily be circumvented, as even simple visual tasks, such as
categorizing motion patterns as moving up or down (Meteyard,
Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007) or detecting backward-masked stim-
uli (Lupyan & Spivey, 2010a) are still subject to semantic pro-
cessing (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) and may therefore involve
high-level integration processes (Francken, Meijs, Hagoort, van
Gaal, & de Lange, 2015; Francken, Meijs, Ridderinkhof, et al.,
2015).
In order to find out whether object words activate low-level
visual representations, it is necessary to isolate processes that are
unequivocally part of basic visual processing and that do not tap
into high-level systems. This can be achieved by means of a
detection paradigm implemented in the binocular rivalry technique
called continuous flash suppression (CFS). CFS is typically used in
research on subconscious visual processing because of its capacity
to render pictures invisible for relatively long periods of time
(Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). CFS disrupts processing of visual
stimuli (Gayet, van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Kang, Blake, &
Woodman, 2011; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011), such that they
elicit only weak activity in visual areas. At the same time it does
not hinder other concurrent cognitive tasks, such that, for instance,
auditory stimuli can be fully processed. Importantly, CSF can be
used to study basic visual detection, which is generally accepted to
be a basic visual process. A recent study (Stein, Thoma, & Sterzer,
2015) has scrutinized the factors underlying the detection of pic-
tures in CFS and found that holistic representations played no
integral role for this task, further supporting the low-level nature of
the process. This makes CFS an ideal tool to study the potential
involvement of low-level visual processes in spoken word process-
ing, namely, by testing the effect of words on the mere detection
of the presence of a stimulus.
Previous research indicates that it is possible for words to boost
otherwise invisible pictures into awareness (Forder, Taylor,
Mankin, Scott, & Franklin, 2016; Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto,
van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015). However, these
studies cannot be taken as evidence that spoken word comprehen-
sion involves rapid activation of low-level visual representations
because the paradigms they used did not tap into the time-course
typically associated with semantic processing (see Hauk &





































































































500 OSTAREK AND HUETTIG
timing). For instance, Lupyan and Ward (2013) had at least 1 s and
Forder et al. (2016) several seconds between word and picture
presentation. These authors used such long delays to address a
different research question, namely, the influence of expectations
on perception, and thus used a set-up that encouraged the use of
top-down expectations. Indeed, Pinto and colleagues’ (2015) Ex-
periment 3 demonstrated that with such long presentation delays
the effect disappears when participants are told that the cue word
is not predictive of the target picture. Thus, it is unclear from the
above research whether spoken word processing involves the rapid
activation of low-level visual representations that is predicted by
theories that ascribe an important role to modality-specific repre-
sentation during processing.
The Present Study
In the present study, we implemented the CFS technique in a
priming experiment to test whether spoken (object) words activate
low-level visual representations. In particular, we tested whether
participants can detect otherwise invisible objects when they are
near-simultaneously presented with a spoken word (e.g., the word
“bottle”) and a suppressed picture (e.g., the picture of a bottle). In
contrast to the studies mentioned above, we tested for rapid acti-
vation of visual representations by minimizing the delay between
word and target picture presentation. Our hypothesis was that
spoken object words can activate category-specific low-level vi-
sual representations rapidly and in a short time window. Access to
category-specific visual representations was operationalized as
facilitated detection of nearly invisible pictures that were masked
with CFS and only briefly presented (for a duration of 400 ms)
shortly after word onset.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-four native Dutch speakers from the
local Max Planck Institute (MPI) database took part in the study.
All participants had normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Five participants had to be excluded (two because
of a detection rate 5%, two because of false alarm rates 50%,
one because of technical failure) and were replaced by new par-
ticipants to reach a total of 24 participants. This number should
yield adequate statistical power based on similar previous research
(Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto et al., 2015).
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. Participants were asked
to wear custom-made prism glasses (prism diopter: 10) as well as
headphones and to put their head on a chinrest. A separator was
placed centrally from the nose of the participant to the computer
screen, such that each eye could only see the ipsilateral half of the
screen. The stimuli were presented on a computer screen (resolu-
tion: 1900 720, refresh rate: 60 Hz) using Presentation Software
(Version 16.2, www.neurobs.com) in 80 cm viewing distance
which ensured optimal interocular fusion in this particular setup.
The CFS masks were randomly selected for every trial from a set
of 50 Mondrian-type images composed of 1,000 randomly super-
imposed rectangles of different colors and sizes, which were
created in Matlab (similar to Hesselmann, Darcy, Ludwig, &
Sterzer, 2016). The 16 target pictures were selected from the
normed de Groot, Koelewijn, Huettig, and Olivers (2016) data-
base, converted into grayscale and their edges blurred using a
Gaussian filter with a radius of 3 pixels in Adobe Photoshop to
facilitate suppression. The 16 spoken cue words (listed in the
Appendix, mean length: 500 ms, range: 287–685 ms) were re-
corded by a female native Dutch speaker and cut into single files
with Praat (Boersma, 2002).
At the beginning of each trial (Figures 1 and 2), a central
fixation cross was displayed alongside a black rectangular frame
(600  600 pixels) in both halves of the screen for 500 ms. Next,
a spoken word was presented. In picture-present trials, 200 ms
after word onset the suppressed picture appeared: the CFS masks
filled the black frame on one side (random Mondrian-type colorful
rectangular shapes changing at 12 Hz) and a gray-scale picture
filled 350  350 pixels the other (on half of the trials this side
stayed empty as there was no picture). In keeping with Lupyan and
Ward (2013), the target pictures were presented to the right eye.
The visual stimuli remained on the screen for 400 ms and were
then replaced by the question “Was there a picture?” to which
participants were instructed to respond immediately by pressing
the left or right button. On picture-absent trials, the 350  350
pixel area that would otherwise be covered by an image that
showed only an empty white square (everything else was identical
to picture-present trials). Participants were informed that the words
neither predicted whether a picture was presented on a given trial
nor what picture appeared in picture-present trials. There were a
total of 256 trials (corresponding to 8 repetitions of each of the 16
words and targets), including 128 picture-present trials of which 64
had congruent and 64 had incongruent prime words.
One prerequisite for this study was good control over the sup-
pression strength such that, ideally, the detection rate of target
Figure 1. Binocular fusion. A picture was presented to the right eye,
while the left eye saw CFS masks changing at ca. 10 Hz. See the online





































































































501SPOKEN WORDS ACTIVATE LOW-LEVEL VISUAL PROCESSES
pictures would be about 50%. To that aim, we first conducted a
short staircase procedure (96 trials) that was identical to the main
study described above, except that no auditory cues were played
and another set of pictures was used. In this staircase procedure,
every hit resulted in a slight decrease and every miss in a slight
increase of the target picture’s contrast, such that the suppression
strength usually converges roughly on 50% (as in Lupyan & Ward,
2013, Experiment 3). The final contrast level was then used in the
main experiment to counter individual differences in visibility
thresholds and avoid ceiling or floor effects.
Analysis. We implemented a design in which all words ap-
peared equally often in picture-present (50%) and picture-absent
trials (50%). In picture-present trials, all cue words were followed
equally often by congruent (50%) and incongruent targets (50%).
Thus, in half of the picture-present trials, the spoken word was
congruent with the target picture (“bottle” ¡ picture of a bottle),
while on the other half it was incongruent (“bottle” ¡ picture of
a banana). We chose this design because it rules out any confounds
due to differences in low-level features between conditions, as all
picture stimuli are evenly distributed over the experimental con-
ditions. Our main prediction that congruency would lead to facil-
itated detection was tested in three ways: First, we analyzed
detection rates in a binomial mixed-effects model, including con-
gruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as fixed effect and random
intercepts and slopes for the effect of congruency by participant
and target. Second, we analyzed d=-scores that take into account
the false alarm rate each participant produced. This was achieved
by calculating mean detection rates in the congruent and incon-
gruent condition as wells as false alarm rates per subject, then
calculating d=-scores, and finally comparing the resulting scores in
the congruent versus incongruent condition in paired-samples t
tests. Third, we analyzed reaction times (RTs) on all picture-
present trials with hits using a linear mixed-effects model with the
same fixed and random effects structure as the binomial model
above. RTs slower than 2.5 s and further than 2.5 SD from the
resulting mean per condition were removed from the analysis.
Results
Of primary interest was whether congruent word cues facilitate
the detection of almost invisible pictures. Inspection of the hit rate
means suggests that this is indeed so (see Figure 3); in congruent
trials the mean detection rate was 46.7%, whereas in incongruent
trials the mean detection rate was only 41.7% (false alarm rate was
15%). A d=-analysis revealed higher d=-scores, t(23)  3.008, p 
.006 in the congruent (M  1.15, SD  0.63) versus incongruent
condition (M  0.99, SD  0.60; Figure 4). The binomial mixed-
effects model further backs up this result by revealing a significant
difference in hit rates between the congruent versus incongruent
condition (coef.  0.2724, SE  0.1168, z  2.332, p 
.0197). Finally, a linear mixed-effects model showed that re-
sponse latencies in correct hit trials were reliably shorter in the
congruent versus incongruent condition (coef.  46.30, SE 
17.68, t  2.619, p  .009; Figure 5).
Discussion
As predicted, processing spoken words made it more likely for
participants to detect congruent compared with incongruent sup-
pressed pictures. This result conceptually replicates previous CFS
studies that showed that words can be used as cues to affect
perception (cf., Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto et al., 2015) and a
recent EEG study (Boutonnet & Lupyan, 2015) that demonstrated
that words (e.g., cat) but not equally informative environmental
sounds (a meowing cat) modulate the P1 component in a subse-
quent picture-matching task. Our results go further by demonstrat-
ing that spoken word comprehension results in rapid activation of
low-level visual representations, as the spoken word and sup-
pressed picture were presented near-simultaneously. We thus con-
clude that spoken words can activate category-specific visual rep-
resentations that are low-level enough to influence a process as
basic as the mere detection of a stimulus in line with modality-
specific theories of conceptual representation. The timing of the
spoken word and the following suppressed picture tells us that this
effect is present roughly somewhere between 200 and 600 ms post
word onset. To further pin down its exact time-course, we con-
ducted a second experiment in which the timing of the suppressed
picture relative to the prime word was systematically manipulated.
Figure 2. Trial structure. Note that the target picture was presented 200
ms after word onset, but the words extended toward target picture offset
(mean word length: 500 ms). See the online article for the color version of
this figure.
Figure 3. Experiment 1. Mean hit rates in the congruent and incongruent
conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the online





































































































502 OSTAREK AND HUETTIG
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the effect we found in
Experiment 1 and to identify its time-course. To that aim, we
modified the paradigm slightly such that the suppressed pictures
were again presented for 400 ms, but the timing of the picture
relative to word onset was manipulated within subjects. We were
mainly interested in two aspects: first, we wanted to find out how
early visual representations are activated during word processing,
as this should be informative about the underlying processing
dynamics of language comprehension. We predicted early recruit-
ment (within the first 400 ms), which would be consistent with the
idea that the visual system contributes to conceptual processing of
spoken words. Second, and related to that matter, we wanted to see
how long-lasting the effect is. In the scenario we envisage, spoken
words trigger a rapid and short-lived sweep of activation in visual
cortex as part of information retrieval related to word meaning.
From that the prediction follows that the effect is only present in
the first hundreds of milliseconds post word onset and that it then
vanishes. At first sight, this prediction may seem to contradict
previous demonstrations of late effects of word cues on detection
in CFS (Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto et al., 2015). However, as
discussed above, because of the differences in timing our experi-
mental design likely taps mechanisms directly related to initial
word processing, whereas these previous studies were designed to
capture the effect of expectations on perception that may follow a
different time-course.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight new native Dutch speakers with
normal hearing and vision from the MPI database participated in
the experiment. Five of them had to be excluded from the analysis
(3 because of a mean detection rate 90%, 2 because of false
alarm rates 40%), leaving us with 33 participants. The increased
number of participants was chosen to make sure the study is
powerful enough, given that we introduce a new factor (timing) to
the design.
Stimuli, apparatus, and design. We used the same stimuli,
apparatus, and design as in Experiment 1 with the following
exceptions: (a) we introduced the factor timing to the design,
which had four levels corresponding to stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) 1 (200–200 ms; picture appears 200 ms before until 200
ms after word onset), SOA 2 (0–400 ms; picture appears at word
onset until 400 ms after word onset), SOA 3 (200–600 ms; from
200 ms after word onset until 600 ms after word onset), and SOA
4 (600–1,000 ms; from 600 ms after word onset until 1,000 ms
after word onset); and (b) to ensure sufficient statistical power we
increased the number of trials to 384 and changed the ratio of
picture-present versus picture-absent trials to 2:1, as we were
primarily interested in detected pictures. This made it possible to
repeat each picture twice in each timing condition per prime word.
Again, before the main experiment, participants completed the
staircase procedure described above to identify individual detec-
tion thresholds that were then used during the main experiment.
Analysis. We predicted that congruency between the prime
word and the suppressed picture would facilitate detection at SOA 2
and 3, but not at SOA 1 and 4. Regarding SOA 1 (200 ms), by the
time that the word cue becomes informative the picture has already
disappeared and it therefore should not have an effect. With respect to
SOA 4 (600 ms), we propose that detection performance is not
affected by the word primes because it falls outside of the window
typically associated with online semantic processing. Category-
specific activation in the visual cortex triggered by the prime word
should therefore have decayed when the picture appears. To test these
hypotheses, we used the same set of analyses as before, adapted for
the current design as follows. First, the binomial mixed-effects model
included congruency and timing as well as their interaction as fixed
effects and random intercepts and slopes for both fixed effects per
subjects and per items. To analyze in which time-windows there was
an effect, we used the function lsmeans from the lsmeans package that
Figure 4. Experiment 1. Mean d=-scores in the congruent and incongru-
ent conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 5. Experiment 1. Mean reaction times (RTs) in the congruent and
incongruent conditions on all trials with hits after removing outliers
(RTs 2.5 s and 2.5 SD from the mean). Error bars indicate 95%






































































































503SPOKEN WORDS ACTIVATE LOW-LEVEL VISUAL PROCESSES
computes least-squares means (also called predicted marginal means)
for all factor combinations and the contrasts among them. Second, we
calculated d=-scores and submitted them to a 2 4 repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for which we predicted a significant
interaction. Follow-up paired-samples t tests were used to determine
the effect of congruency at all four SOAs. Finally, for the RT data we
ran a linear mixed-effects model on all trials with detected pictures
excluding responses slower than 2,500 ms, as well as responses
further than 2.5 SD from the mean calculated per condition. The
model had the same fixed and random effects structure as the bino-
mial model above and all effects were analyzed in the same way.
Results and Discussion
Of primary interest was at what SOA congruency affected detec-
tion. Figures 6 and 8 suggest that detection was facilitated by con-
gruent words at Timings 2 and 3, but that there was no difference
between congruent and incongruent trials at the other two timings.
The 2  4 ANOVA on d=-scores revealed a main effect of congru-
ency (F(1, 32)  14.066, p  .001, 2p  0.305) and an interaction
between congruency and timing (F(3, 96)  3.681, p  .015, 2p 
0.103). Follow-up paired t tests revealed that, indeed, congruency had
no effect on detection sensitivity at SOA 1 (mean d= difference: 0.048,
t(32)1) and SOA 4 (mean difference: 0.045, t(32) 1.087, p .2),
while there was a reliable effect at SOA 2 (mean difference: 0.174,
t(32) 3.349, p .002) and SOA 3 (mean difference: 1.191, t(32)
4.874, p  .001). In line with this, the binomial mixed-effects model
on hit rates revealed a significant interaction between congruency and
timing (	2(3) 7.863, p .048), characterized by the pattern that hit
rates were higher in the congruent versus incongruent condition at
SOA 2 (coef.  0.348, SE  0.12, p  .003) and 3 (coef.  0.415,
SE 0.122, p .001), but not at SOA 1 (coef. 0.081, SE 0.121,
p  .5) and 4 (coef.  0.108, SE  1.21, p  .3).1 As a follow-up,
we also conducted a logistic growth curve analysis (Mirman, 2016)
with a second-order polynomial including fixed-effects of congruency
on both time terms and participant and participant-by-condition ran-
dom effects on the quadratic term (the full model did not converge, so
the linear term was removed because it was not expected to capture
key differences). As expected from the results above, it revealed a
significant main effect of congruency (coef.  0.178, SE  0.049,
p .001) and a significant effect of congruency on the quadratic term
(coef. 0.218, SE 0.091, p .016). Figure 7 shows the model fit.
In sum, the hit rate and d=-scores provide converging evidence that
our design captured both the onset and offset of the detection facili-
tation effect (Figures 6, 7, and 8).
RT analyses revealed a main effect of congruency (coef. 
0.144, SE  0.063, t  2.287, p  .022), but no interaction with
timing (p  .1). This result in combination with visual inspection
suggests that RTs were influenced by congruency at the earliest
and latest SOAs (Figure 9). The most likely explanation for this
seems to be that at SOA 1 and 4 Congruency affected participants’
confidence in their decisions, rather than perceptual processing.
Given the clear results from the hit rate and d= data, we consider
our results to provide strong evidence for a time-dependent effect,
as described below.
General Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicate the effect we observed in
Experiment 1 and also revealed the dynamic activation and deactiva-
tion of low-level visual representations over time during spoken word
processing. In addition to our replication of the effect at Timing 3,
where the nearly invisible picture is presented 200–600 ms after word
onset, the novel effect at Timing 2 (0–400 ms) in combination with
the absence of an effect at 200 ms before until 200 ms after word
onset suggests that category-specific low-level visual representations
were first accessed at 200–400 ms after word onset. Strikingly, for
some of our words this is before the uniqueness point that disambig-
uates them from other possible words. This is reminiscent of Lewis
and Poeppel’s (2014) MEG study that found a correlation between
imageability and occipital cortex activation (in BA 19) at 160–190 ms
post onset, simultaneously or even before typical lexical effects (such
as cohort and frequency effects) in temporal areas. A likely explana-
tion for this even quicker activation compared with our study is that
these authors only used monosyllabic words consisting of three to
four phonemes that were simply shorter than the stimuli used here.
Access to visual areas around the uniqueness point is consistent with
a role for semantic processing. Furthermore, the absence of an effect
at the latest time window (600–1,000 ms after word onset) suggests
that the recruitment of low-level visual representations is limited to
the first hundreds of milliseconds of spoken word processing. At
around word offset, the effect has completely vanished, suggesting a
rapid decay after initial rapid activation.
Thus, we observed activation of visual representations in precisely
the time-window that is associated with semantic access. Given the
behavioral relevance of the activated representations for the detection
paradigm we used, we can conclude that spoken words (referring to
concrete concepts) activate modality-specific visual representations
that are low-level enough to provide information related to the per-
ception of a given token and, at the same time, abstract enough to be
relevant not only for previously seen tokens (a signature of episodic
memory) but also for generalizing to novel exemplars one has never
1 False alarm rates were similar across SOAs (8.2%–10.3%).
Figure 6. Experiment 2. Mean hit rates in all experimental conditions
(congruent vs. incongruent at all four timing conditions). Error bars indi-






































































































504 OSTAREK AND HUETTIG
seen before (a signature of semantic memory). A mechanism that
could accomplish this is the activation of visual features that are
diagnostic of the category the word refers to. Attention to a semantic
category can shift tuning of neuron populations in occipital and
temporal cortex toward that category (Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, &
Gallant, 2013). Similarly, our results suggest that words may rapidly
trigger the activation of low-level visual representations and, as a
result, enhance processing of visual items sharing some of these
representations.
Note that our present findings do not contradict the previous CFS
studies reporting late cuing effects (e.g., Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto
et al., 2015). Their elegant studies add on to the increasing literature
on how expectations can affect perception. We would like to point out
that both their findings and our present results could be interpreted in
a predictive coding framework and may rely on similar neural mech-
anisms (described in D’Esposito & Postle, 2015; Pratte & Tong, 2014;
Scocchia, Valsecchi, & Triesch, 2014). Importantly, however, regard-
ing our research question, the present study demonstrates the rapid
involvement of low-level visual representations during online spoken
word processing in a situation where the words were no reliable cues
for the visual targets.
Future work could usefully investigate the underlying processing
dynamics in terms of information exchange between sensorimotor
systems, on the one hand, and high-level integration systems on the
other. There is now good evidence that parts of the parietal lobe
(especially the angular gyrus) and/or the anterior temporal lobe (ATL)
are consistently involved in conceptual processing encompassing in-
formation from multiple modalities and it has been proposed that they
could function as hubs that integrate information from distributed
cortical sites (Binder & Desai, 2011; Binder et al., 2009; Patterson,
Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Xu, Lin, Han, He, & Bi, 2016). Strong
evidence comes from studies showing modality-independent semantic
impairments induced by ATL damage (e.g., Mummery et al., 2000) or
by transcranial magnetic stimulation on ATL (Pobric, Jefferies, &
Lambon Ralph, 2010a, 2010b), suggesting a functional role of ATL
for conceptual processing. Using electrocorticography, Chen and col-
leagues (2016) recently managed to decode semantic information
related to concepts from a wide array of categories from ATL activity
patterns, supporting its category-general role for semantic processing.
Similarly, Correia et al. (2014) were able to decode word meanings
from ATL using fMRI.
Moreover, there are some clues as to what neural mechanisms
could underlie communication between the different systems. ATL
has been shown to engage in increased connectivity with modality-
specific visual or auditory regions during semantic processing. When
information from multiple modalities has to be combined, theta os-
cillations in ATL and distributed cortical networks become phase-
Figure 7. Experiment 2. Model fit of the logistic growth curve analysis
depicted by plotting the observed data (dots correspond to the observed
means) along with the predicted curve. Error bars indicate the standard
error. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 8. Experiment 2. Mean d=-scores in all experimental conditions
(congruent vs. incongruent at all four timing conditions). Error bars indi-
cate the standard error. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
Figure 9. Experiment 2. Mean reaction times (RTs) in all experimental
conditions (congruent vs. incongruent at all four timing conditions), cal-
culated on trials with hits after removing outliers (RTs2.5 s and2.5 SD
from the mean). Error bars indicate the standard error. See the online article
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locked as a function of the featural content required (van Ackeren,
2014, chapters 3 and 6; van Ackeren & Rueschemeyer, 2014; van
Ackeren, Schneider, Müsch, & Rueschemeyer, 2014). Coutanche and
Thompson-Schill (2015) found that the identity of expected objects
participants were thinking about could be decoded from ATL patterns
and that decoding accuracy was predicted by activation patterns in
visual areas processing shape and color information related to the
object, further pointing to the functional link between visual and
high-level systems in conceptual processing. In the light of these
findings, our data fit with the view that words trigger (potentially
simultaneously) the activation of modality-specific as well as
modality-independent systems that remain coupled for several hun-
dreds of milliseconds to build a conceptual representation in concert.
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Appendix
List of Stimuli
Stimuli categories: banana, crane, palm tree, hark, ball, injection, pen, butterfly, brain, bottle, hat, cushion,
rocket, flute, (a kind of) sweet.
Corresponding Dutch words: banaan, kraan, palm, hark, ball, spuitje, pen, vlinder, hersens, fles, hoed,
kussen, raket, fluit, bonbon.
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